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RECENT BOOKS 
THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC. By Adolf A. Berle. New York: Har-
court, Brace & World. 1963. Pp. xv, 238. $4.50. 
Few lawyers have been so provocative and so influential on economic 
and business subjects as Professor Adolf Berle. His important government 
service, distinguished academic career, experience in private law practice 
and politics, and past literary performance all combine to make the advent 
of a new book by Professor Berle a matter of some moment. The anticipa-
tion is heightened when it is realized that this time Professor Berle has made 
the entire American economic system his province. Indeed the very title, 
The American Economic Republic, sounds the grandeur and scope of the 
investigation. 
The book, part of which comprised the 1963 W. W. Cook Lectures at 
the University of Michigan Law School, seeks to describe the American 
economy as it actually operates, to adumbrate a theoretical basis for our 
modem economic institutions and to offer an explanation for the phenome-
nal success of our economic machinery. Much of the material deals with 
notions more fully developed in The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revo-
lution1 and Power Without Property.2 As the author states, the book is 
more an outline than a detailed economic treatise. Included are a dis-
cussion of Berle's familiar and somewhat vulnerable concept of private 
property, his argument that the power-property nexus has been severed, a 
somewhat elaborate discussion of capital markets and capital formation 
and a rather circumscribed evaluation of the free market and the profit 
motive. 
An interesting new aspect of Berle's thinking is his defense of what he 
terms "passive property."3 Regular readers of Berle will recall that "passive 
property" generally refers to accumulated wealth in the form of common 
stock. The very presence of arguments for a wealthy elite reflects an in-
teresting new departure for Berle. But he does not sound strongly convinced 
of the necessity for this deviation from what he would consider an optimal 
distribution of wealth. The equality cat is perhaps let out of the inequality 
bag when one of the justifications offered is that a wealthy elite makes 
possible the application and collection of taxes which would otherwise be 
impossible. More interesting, however, are his arguments that wealth gives 
greater opportunity for individual self-realization and that it makes possible 
an "untrammeled leisure class" from which come university instructors, 
diplomats, politicians, and country newspaper editors (and presumably a 
wide assortment of other dilettantes). Finally, this class provides resources 
for activities not carried on commercially and which presumably should not 
1 BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REvoLUTION (1954). 
2 BEllLE, POWEil WITHOUT PROPER.TY (1959). 
a Pp. 43-59. 
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be exclusively governmental, such as universities, hospitals and foundations.4 
The most notable omission from the list of functions performed by a 
wealthy class is the accumulation of savings with its concomitant amount 
of capital investment. This omission is consistent with Berle's position 
that corporations and not individuals account for the major part of savings 
in the American economy. This is a vital part of Berle's argument that 
shareholders, the nominal owners of corporations, do not exercise any of 
the traditional functions of ownership, since shareholders' "investment" 
activities or stock market operations are irrelevant to corporate managers' 
investment decisions. This freedom from market constraint in tum allows 
managers to become a self-perpetuating oligarchy beholden only to their 
own conscience and the federal government.5 
What then is the origin of investment capital? True to modem liberal 
economic philosophy, Berle finds it in the consumer. Since corporations 
accumulate earnings out of the profits made on the sale of goods, it is the 
consumers' dollar which expands industrial empires and builds factories 
and mills. Corporate investors, in the sense of those owning equity securities, 
get no credit for this function. Manifestly they could not in Berle's scheme, 
because they have no power to influence investment decisions. 
It is not inaccurate to say that the particular dollar which an individual 
says he "invests" in the stock market is not invested in capital equipment 
by the corporation. Indeed, the corporation would ordinarly never see 
that particular dollar at all (except, as Berle points out, in the relatively 
few cases in which a company sells a new issue to the public). But even 
though individual savings (including those thrown into the stock market) 
are not identical with business investment at any particular moment, a 
tendency for savings to equal investment is necessarily present. The two 
are merely supply and demand functions in the special context of the 
capital market. This market certainly exists, and it cannot be made immune 
to the forces of supply and demand, complex though a complete market 
analysis might be. 
The stock market is a distinctive but functional part of the total capital 
market. At any given moment the addition of new dollars to the stock 
market may have the effect only of raising stock prices. But this in tum 
affects the dynamic forces, including corporate investments, constantly tend-
ing to create a new equilibrium position in the capital market. And ceteri.s 
paribus a lowering of the price of capital will cause more to be used. The 
relationship between the stock market and corporate investment decisions 
may not be immediately evident, but it exists, substantially as delineated 
in classical theory.6 
4 Readers desiring a more elegant brief for a wealthy elite should see DE JouvENEL, 
THE ETHICS OF REDISTRIBUTION (1951). 
5 See BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REvOLUTION (1954). 
6 See Linter, The Financing of Corporations, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN 
SOCIETY 166, 200 (Mason ed. 1960). For very recent additional evidence that the capital 
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A less technical answer to Berle is that corporate investment of its re-
tained earnings is in reality new equity investment by the shareholders 
of the corporation. Basically this is the argument that a corporation is 
merely an administrative device for central management of the investments 
of a large number of people. Given the undisputed liquidity of the American 
stock market (certainly for shares of large corporations), a shareholder is 
free at any time his interests dictate to convert corporate earnings reflected 
in the market price into personally held cash. As long as the market is not 
capricious and arbitrary, as Berle is perforce obliged to maintain that it is,7 
the price the shareholder gets for his shares will reflect the accumulated 
earnings of the corporation. If a shareholder elects to retain or buy shares 
in a corporation whose managers are known to reinvest corporate-retained 
earnings, he has effectively made a decision to allow these funds to be so 
reinvested, albeit by someone acting for him in a representative capacity. 
Part II of Berle's book, while purporting to be a brief description of 
the major institutions of the contemporary American economy, is in reality 
a brief description of the federal government's activities in the economic 
area. Discussed are the functions of the Council of Economic Advisors, the 
Joint Committee on the Economic Report, the Bureau of the Budget, the 
Federal Reserve Board, the Treasury Department, some regulatory agencies 
and the Justice Department. A survey is made of the activities owned or 
controlled by the federal government, including the defense establishment, 
the flow of credit, transportation, communications, public utilities and 
agriculture. There is also an imposing list of industries over whom the 
indirect controls are rather potent. Unfortunately, state and local govern-
ments, which in 1960 accounted for nearly thirty-nine percent of total 
direct government expenditures8 and also undoubtedly accounted for a 
very considerable amount of regulation and control, find no place in Berle's 
economic republic. 
Berle's emphasis on the federal government's economic role leads him to 
slight not only the local government sector, but makes him seriously distort 
and undervalue the entire, gigantic private sector of the economy. In Berle's 
world the free market is merely another of the many tools the federal 
government uses to direct the economy. In fact, it appears repeatedly that 
the market exists only at the sufferance of the federal government and would 
collapse, stagnate or become totally monopolized without the government's 
constant effort to maintain it as a healthy part of overall economic 
regulation.o 
Since Berle does not see the markets as performing the functions tradi-
tionally attributed to them, it is not surprising that he renews his defense of 
market functions in accord with classical theory, see STIGLER, CAPITAL AND RATES OF 
RErultN JN MANUFACTURING lNDUSllUES (1963). 
7 P. 130. 
8 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcrs OF THE U.S. 416 (1962). 
9 E.g., p. 145. . 
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cartel practices, whether of the real variety enforced by the federal or state 
governments, or the possibly imaginary variety alleged in the steel industry. 
In either case, while not specifically recommending the repeal of the Sher-
man Act, Berle suggests that the "administered" price arrangement is 
necessitated by the undesirable effects of uncontrolled competition. Without 
batting a critical or skeptical eye Berle traces developments in the petroleum 
industry from 1933 and the NRA through the Interstate Oil Compact and 
the "Hot Oil" Act. The result, in an industry riven by Department of 
Interior estimates of demand and Texas Railroad Commission proration 
orders, is, as no one would deny, an "administered price." The shocking 
part of this is Berle's conclusion that this result in the oil industry was 
"desired by all hands.''10 Apparently "all hands" refers only to those with 
sufficient political power to be influential, for no rational consumer would 
ever consciously choose this kind of gasoline price-fixing. Nor would he 
agree with Berle's assumption that everyone is really very happy with the 
price-boosting arrangements prevalent in the sugar industry, non-ferrous 
metals, or in controlled agriculture generally. Similarly, a part of Berle's 
justification (mild though it is) for our present farm program is that the 
results were satisfactory to most farmers.11 Apparently political pressure and 
not rational analysis of economic factors should determine the desirability of 
programs in the American Economic Republic. But economics is not so 
bereft of logic, nor is politics so full of virtue that this should be accepted 
as the tolerable state affairs which Berle suggests.12 
The very selection of matters dealt with by the author makes the work 
more an apologia for government regulation than a comprehensive survey 
of the American economy. But the real process of politics, certainly an 
integral part of federal economic activity, is, like the treatment of local 
government, strangely missing. Thus, we find no reference to the activities 
of the many lobbyists in Washington, recurrent stories of ineptitude or 
political bias among regulatory agencies or the effect of a government so 
vast that even the best informed citizens cannot know more than a small 
part of what is actually transpiring. Instead we find the surprising statement 
that "[A]n unwritten constitutional rule prohibits the use of political 
power in business administration, and vice versa. . . . Retribution is . . . 
swift where there is political interference with an American corporation, 
or where an American corporation incautiously induces a political officer 
to betray his trust in its favor."18 Probably no humor was intended by the 
use of the word "incautiously" in the last sentence, but it does suggest 
10 P. 157. 
11 P. 143. 
12 Consider, for instance, the following: "The economic republic has had to choose 
between an unnecessarily large but prosperous farming community with a concomitant 
oversupply and a tax burden or reverting to the old nineteenth-century market economy, 
where oversupply reduced the price enormously-and the producer to poverty." Pp. 143-
44. Clearly there are other possibilities. 
13 P. 12. 
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that the awful thing in such activity is to get caught. Berle is not naive and 
is well acquainted with President Kennedy's altercation with the steel com-
panies in 1962; he is likewise fully familiar with the activities of very highly 
paid Washington lawyers. His statement then, like many others in this 
book, can only be taken as an ideal of the system as Berle sees it, not an 
objective description of how the American Economic Republic actually 
operates. 
But Professor Berle despairs of offering a fully scientific analysis of the 
American economy. Having discarded self-interests, profit motivation, and 
the value theory growing out of neo-classical utility analysis, Berle is faced 
with the problem of discovering the fuel which makes his system operate, 
the force which allows men to reach such happy welfare solutions as we 
presently know. To meet this need Berle has elaborated his thesis of the 
"transcendental margin." Like many things transcendental, this one too 
eludes precise definition, although Berle invests it with some readily recog-
nizable functions and characteristics. The "transcendental margin" is the 
American variant of the Protestant ethic, though it is not the same ethic as 
Weber and Tawney associated with a rather base profit motive. This 
American Protestant ethic emphasizes "the motivation of universal and 
selfless love--men were not justified merely by saving their own souls."14 
Not only is the "transcendental margin" the embodiment of most 
American virtues, but, like virtue, it carries its own reward. For ethereal 
though this quality may be, it provides the needed fillip to make our economy 
successful. Berle recounts the happy material advantages we have serendip-
itously enjoyed because of such non-profit motivated activity as public 
education, foreign aid and welfare programs generally. But the latter two 
points are merely pump-priming arguments that such programs cause more 
money to be spent for consumption. And education, Berle explains, by 
increasing the desire for better things, induces more work to satisfy those 
desires.115 • 
This last argument for the "transcendental margin" as exemplified by 
our policy toward education is remarkable for its similarity to the theory 
regularly advanced by spokesmen for the advertising industry. Substitute 
the word "advertising" for the word "education," and nothing else need be 
changed. While the argument has some dignity as applied to advertising, 
it seems a bit demeaning as applied to education. Transcendental margins 
leave room for strange bedfellows.16 
The real difficulty with Berle's "transcendental margin" is not in the 
substance of what Berle suggests. No one should deny the spirit of altruism, 
neighborliness and brotherly love which is an important strain of the 
historical American character. But Berle fails to recognize that virtue, 
14 P. 192. 
lli P. 204. 
16 Compare in this regard the discussion of education by a spokesman for "old style" 
capitalism in FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85 (1962). 
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strong character and tolerance for hard work are rarely issued to the popula-
tion by governments. Certainly, as Berle suggests, these traits are reflected 
in the political results of our democracy, but these traits are not accidental 
in America. They are closely related to the kind of freedom in economic 
matters which has characterized and, I respectfully suggest, still does largely 
characterize the American republic. 
Berle's great faith in the political process and the ability of men to govern 
others intelligently must be viewed as an important part of modem idealism. 
His low regard for the unregulated private economic sphere, while also a 
modern attitude, should certainly be eschewed by anyone concerned with 
economic progress, political reality and, in no small measure, individual 
freedom. 
Henry G. Manne, 
Associate Professor of Law, 
The George Washington University 
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